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THE SUBPRIME MORASS: PAST, PRESENT, AND
FUTURE
KENNETH C. JOHNSTON, JAMES B. GREER, JULIE K. BIERMACHER
AND JOSEPH HUMMEL*
I. INTRODUCTION
The subprime mortgage crisis is resulting in a sea of
litigation presenting novel and significant legal problems. These
issues will affect a universe of potential defendants including
traditional lenders, investment banks, and investors. This article
seeks to provide a practical understanding of how the subprime
crisis occurred, and a synopsis of the legal ramifications and
litigation trends associated with the fallout.
II. THE GENESIS OF THE QUAGMIRE
A. The Development and Growth of Subprime Mortgage
Loans
The subprime mortgage is a relatively new product niche in
the mortgage lending industry virtually unheard of prior to the
mid-1990s1 A subprime mortgage loan is by definition a mortgage
loan to a borrower with sub-standard credit.' In the decade since
the subprime mortgage loan was first developed, it flourished as
the vehicle by which lenders funded loans to borrowers who, for
* Kenneth C. Johnston is a partner at Kane Russell Coleman & Logan PC in Dallas,
Texas and a member of the Board of Advisors for the University of North Carolina
School of Law, Center for Banking and Finance. Julie K. Biermacher and James B.
Greer are associates of the firm. Joseph Hummel attends Southern Methodist
University School of Law and will join Kane Russell upon graduation in May 2008.
1. This article does not address issues presented by subprime lending in the auto
finance or manufactured housing industries.
2. See Henry v. Lehman Commercial Paper, Inc., 471 F.3d 977, 984 (9th Cir.
2006); see also Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. v. Advanta Corp., No. Civ.A.01-507
KAJ, 2005 WL 2234608, at *1 (D. Del. Sept. 8, 2005).
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various reasons ranging from poor credit histories to unstable
income levels, would not generally qualify for traditional or prime
rate loans.3
To compensate for the increased risk of making subprime
loans, the upfront and continuing costs of a subprime loan are
higher than that of a traditional loan.4 For example, the average
interest rate of a fixed-rate subprime loan at origination was over
two percent higher than the rate of prime loans at origination,
from 1995 to 2004.' However, as was all too often overlooked by
the prospective subprime borrower, the majority of subprime loans
tend to be adjustable-rate *mortgages (ARMs).6
ARMs shift the risk of rate fluctuation from the lender to
the borrower, which can present risks for consumer borrowers who
may be forced to incur higher rates and greater payment
obligations in the future.' Lenders generally charge lower initial
interest rates for ARMs which result in less pressure on the
borrower's pocketbook.8 In some situations, such as when
"discounted" or "teaser rates" are involved, the initial interest rate
will be lower-than-market and will later adjust to a substantially
higher prevailing market rate.9 All types of ARMs present the risk
that an increase in interest rates will lead to a significantly higher
monthly payment. °
Many borrowers obtained ARMs under the impression that
they would be able to refinance at favorable terms before rising
interest rates triggered the ARMs to reset. In the subprime
mortgage environment, ARMs could present significant and
3. See Henry, 471 F.3d at 984.
4. Id.
5. Souphala Chomsisengphet & Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Evolution of
the Subprime Mortgage Market, 88 FED. RES. BANK OF ST. Louis REV. 31,34 (2006).
6. See FED. RES. BD., CONSUMER HANDBOOK ON ADJUSTABLE-RATE
MORTGAGES (2007), http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/arms/arms-english.htm.
ARMs are loans with interest rates that change. Id. The change is usually in
relationship to an index. Id. The most common indexes are the rates on 1-year
constant-maturity Treasury securities, the Cost of Funds Index, and the London
Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR). Id.
7. See GRANT NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON REAL
ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT 935-38 (7th ed. 2006).
8. See FED. RES. BD., supra note 6.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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widespread mortgage default risks because of the likelihood that
subprime borrowers will be unable to service the debt after a rate
adjustment.
The genesis of the subprime market began when Congress
enacted the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA)." DIDMCA preempted state
usury ceilings for most home mortgage loans.12 Congress enacted
DIDMCA during an era of record-high interest rates, in part to
ensure that borrowers in states with low usury ceilings could
obtain loans.13 DIDMCA's deregulation not only permitted higher
conventional mortgage rates in states with low usury ceilings, but
also fostered the growth of the subprime market.
14
The subprime lending spree hit its zenith between 2004 and
2006 in conjunction with the last and most furious phase of the
U.S. housing boom. It is estimated that well over $2 trillion in
ARMs were originated from 2004 to 2006.15 A substantial portion
of these ARMs were subprime loans, representing a historical
departure from traditional prime loan underwriting requirements
in favor of the origination of riskier loans. According to the
Mortgage Bankers Association, approximately 13.1 percent of all
outstanding mortgage indebtedness in the United States is
subprime in nature.16 For the reasons discussed in section II.B,
infra, this departure was a direct function of the fundamentally
different approach to the securitization of the subprime loan
relative to the traditional prime home loan.
According to a study by First American CoreLogic, in 2007
and 2008, "trillions of dollars of adjustable-rate mortgages will
11. See Chomsisengphet & Pennington-Cross, supra note 5, at 38; see also Pub. L.
No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified in various sections of 12 U.S.C.).
12. See Chomsisengphet & Pennington-Cross, supra note 5, at 38.
13. See Deanne Loonin & Elizabeth Renuart, The Life and Debt Cycle: The
Growing Debt Burdens of Older Consumers and Related Policy Recommendations, 44
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 167, 174-75 (2007).
14. See id. at 175.
15. Alistair Barr, 'Tsunami' of Adjustable-Rate Mortgage Resets Coming,
MARKETWATCH, Mar. 23, 2007, http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/mortgage-
reset-tsunami-could-end/story.aspx?guid= %7BECEE333A-22A2-4ECD-8C69-5ED4
31190A9E%7D.
16. See Press Release, Mortgage Bankers Ass'n, Delinquencies and Foreclosures
Increase in Latest MBA National Delinquency Survey (Dec. 6, 2007), http://www.
mbaa.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter/58758.htm.
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have their payments begin to reset."17 If true, this spells exploding
monthly payments for affected consumers just as the housing
market continues to soften and the economic slow down reduces
incomes. The negative impact of the subprime crisis on the cash-
strapped homeowner, however, is just the tip of the iceberg.
B. Funding of Subprime Mortgage Loans Through
Securitization
The growth of the subprime market was fueled by an influx
of investment dollars into the mortgage market from non-
traditional lending sources. This resulted in increased credit access
for the subprime borrower through a financing vehicle for the
securitization of subprime mortgage loans often referred to as
mortgage backed securities (MBSs).' 8 MBSs can take a variety of
structures, but their principal purpose is to transfer the right to
receive "the cash flow from pools of mortgage loans," as well as to
transfer the related default risks, to third-party investors. 19
In a typical "subprime mortgage securitization, a number of
mortgage loans are pooled together and sold into a trust by an
'originator."' 20 "Interests in the trust are in turn sold to investors,"
often known as certificateholders. 21 "The cash from the cert-
ificateholders goes to the originator, and the originator can then
use that cash to originate more loans., 22 Some MBSs issue pass-
through certificates in which the trust passes through principal and
interest payments as they are received, minus certain servicing
17. CHRISTOPHER L. CAGAN, FIRST AMERICAN CORELOGIC, MORTGAGE
PAYMENT RESET: THE ISSUE AND THE IMPACT 2 (2007), available at http://www.
facorelogic.com/uploadedFiles/Newsroom/Studies-andBriefs/Studies/20070048Mort
gagePaymentResetStudyFINAL.pdf.
18. Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Res., Speech at the Economic Club of New
York, New York: The Recent Financial Turmoil and its Economic and Policy
Consequences (Oct. 15, 2007), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/ber
nanke20071015a.htm.
19. U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, Mortgage-Backed Securities (June 25, 2007),
http://www.sec.gov/answers/mortgagesecurities.htm.
20. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. v. Advanta Corp., No. Civ.A.01-507 KAJ,
2005 WL 2234608, at *1 (D. Del. Sept. 8, 2005).
21. Id.; see also U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, supra note 19.
22. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp., 2005 WL 2234608, at *1.
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charges, to the investors on a pro rata basis. 23 Thus, if a loan in the
pool is prepaid, the principal amount of that loan is repaid to the
investor, requiring the investor to find another investment
opportunity for that portion of the initial investment.
A collateralized mortgage obligation (CMO) is also a pool
of mortgage loans, but it issues different classes or tranches of
securities. 2' The cash flows from each tranche are paid out in a
predetermined order.26 The tranches to receive payment first are
the least risky, and accordingly, earn lower interest rates than the
subordinate tranches which are lower in payment priority.27
Subordinate tranches are often quite risky, and sometimes there is
not a ready market for them."
A collateralized debt obligation (CDO) was developed as a
pool of securities issued in CMOs or MBSs. 29 Often the securities
pooled were those that were otherwise rated the lowest by the
credit rating agencies.3° The securities issued by the CDO pools
were also issued in tranches, and the credit rating agencies often
gave a majority of the securities issued an investment grade rating,
even though the pool backing the securities was below investment
grade rated securities.31 The theory was that the investment grade
securities had the higher payment priority and that the likely losses
from the pool would be adequately covered by the investors in the
lowest tranches issued in the CDO.32
While the pooling of mortgage loans into trusts had long
23. U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, supra note 19.
24. Id.
25. U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (June 25,
2007), http://www.sec.gov/answers/tcmos.htm.
26. See id.
27. See Sec. Indus. and Fin. Markets Ass'n, Types of Bonds: The Effect of
Interest Rates on CMO Values and Prepayment Rates, http://www.investinginbonds.
com/learnmore.asp?catid=5&subcatid=17&id=33 (last visited Jan. 30, 2007); see also
U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, supra note 25.
28. See Sec. Indus. and Fin. Markets Ass'n, Types of Bonds: Minimum Invest-
ments, Transaction Costs, and Liquidity, http://www.investinginbonds.com/learnmore
.asp?catid=5&subcatid=17&id=36 (last visited Jan. 30, 2007).
29. See Bethany McLean, The Dangers of Investing in Subprime Debt, CNN, Mar.
19, 2007, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortunearchive/2007/04/02/8403
416/index.htm.
30. Id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
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been the practice of agencies like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,
subject to certain limitations on the total value and credit-related
quality loans eligible for bundling, never before had those on Wall
Street been invested so heavily in securities backed by subprime
loans. With rating institutions like Standard & Poor evaluating
MBSs, CDOs, and CMOs in much the same way that commercial
paper and other similar investments are rated in terms of credit
risk of various levels of tranches,33 these investment vehicles
became highly sought after by pension funds, hedge funds,
investment banks, insurers, and municipalities all over the world.
In essence, this is how the American dream became underwritten
by a cast of unlikely investors, including foreign commercial banks.
C. The Current Crisis
The crisis began with the bursting of the housing and
financial bubbles in late 2006 and early 2007. 4 A report from the
United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) found
that "the rapid decline in the rate of home price appreciation
throughout much of the nation beginning in 2005 may have
reduced incentives for borrowers to keep current on their
mortgages and made it more difficult for borrowers to refinance or
sell their homes to avoid default or foreclosure. ' '35  Regional
36
unemployment, coupled with aggressive lending practices, made
33. See, e.g., Sten Bergman, CDO Evaluator Applies Correlation and Monte
Carlo Simulation to the Art of Determining Portfolio Quality, STANDARD & POOR'S,
Nov. 12, 2001, http://www.standardandpoors.com/emarketing/structuredfinance/copy
ofl 1 1201_evaluator.html.
34. Justin Lahart, Egg Cracks Differ in Housing, Finance Shells, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 24, 2007, at C1.
35. U. S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, BRIEFING TO THE COMMITTEE ON
FINANCIAL SERVICES, SUBJECT: INFORMATION ON RECENT DEFAULT AND
FORECLOSURE TRENDS FOR HOME MORTGAGES AND ASSOCIATED ECONOMIC AND
MARKET DEVELOPMENTS 4 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0878r
.pdf.
36. See Randall S. Kroszner, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Speech at
the Consumer Bankers Association 2007 Fair Lending Conference: The Challenges
Facing Subprime Mortgage Borrowers (Nov. 5, 2007), http://www.bis.org/review/r071
107f.pdf. "The unemployment rate in an area can significantly undermine the ability
of people in that area to repay their mortgages. States in the Midwest hit hardest by
job cuts in the auto industry, such as Michigan and Ohio, are among the states with
the highest rates of new foreclosures." Id.
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it harder for borrowers to meet their mortgage repayment
obligations and the emerging private MBS market lent support to
such practices.37 This combination forced more and more sub-
prime borrowers into an unstable situation where loan default was
the natural result. This precarious situation was solidified into a
position of certain default for many borrowers when ARMs reset,
increasing home mortgage interest rates, in the summer of 2007.38
According to Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, the rate
of serious delinquencies for adjustable rate subprime mortgages
has increased significantly, reaching nearly sixteen percent as of
August 2007, almost three times the recent-low of 2005.29
D. The Fallout
The aggregation of delinquent payments from subprime
borrowers resulted in MBSs losing some or all of their worth as the
underlying assets lost value. Structured securities, CDOs and
CMOs holding MBSs, likewise decreased in value.
The pressure of credit risks and illiquidity has forced many
high profile banks, corporations, and hedge funds to take
enormous write downs and, in some cases, has resulted in
bankruptcy. In July of 2007, Bear Stearns informed investors that
two of its hedge funds, together worth an estimated $1.5 billion in
2006, had nearly lost their entire value.40 The funds, comprised of
subprime MBSs and CDOs, reeled from "unprecedented declines
in the valuations of a number of highly rated [] securities,"
according to the bank.41 However, the funds' decline seems more
closely tied to faltering mortgage securities. For the fourth quarter
of 2007, Morgan Stanley took a $9.4 billion loss related to
subprime-linked investments,42 and in January of 2008, Citigroup
announced it was writing down $22.2 billion due to "mortgage-
37. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 35, at 13.
38. See Les Christie, When Bad Loans Get Worse, CNNMONEY, June 21, 2007,
http://64.236.22.104/2007/06/20/real-estate/whenARMsreset/index.htm.
39. See Bernanke, supra note 18.
40. Gretchen Morgenson, Bear Sterns Says Battered Hedge Funds Are Worth
Little, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2007, at C2.
41. Id.
42. Landon Thomas, Jr., $9.4 Billion Write-Down at Morgan Stanley, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 20, 2007, at C1.
20081
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
related investments and bad loans., 43
Stock market declines among both depository and non-
depository financial corporations were dramatic. Any investors
owning subprime mortgage related financial instruments, which
includes hedge funds, insurance companies, pension funds and
commercial banks, were exposed to significant risk.
III. LITIGATION TRENDS
Not surprisingly, litigation arising from the subprime
meltdown has begun to spread like wildfire in courthouses across
the country. The suits implicate a wide array of issues and parties.
At the most basic level, the subprime litigation involves suits
brought by consumers against their mortgage originators.44 This
tier of consumer litigation involves mostly deceptive trade
practices and unfair debt collection based claims.4 ' The second tier
of litigation involves alleged wrongs in the securitization process.
To a large extent, the securitization litigation is primarily focused
on the valuation of constituent pooled mortgages, mortgage
backed securities, and their corresponding structured investments.
Significant securities-related litigation is also arising out of the
subprime rubble. In the securities litigation realm, the SEC has
already started investigating investment banks, mutual fund
managers, company executives and the like for possible securities
fraud related to the subprime market. Lastly, in recent weeks the
contours of subprime litigation have expanded into the unexpected
realm of what can only be coined as "public interest litigation."
This typifies just how far the subprime fallout extends. The
following are examples from each emerging area of litigation.
A. Consumer Litigation - Novastar Mortgage Class Action
NovaStar Mortgage, a Missouri-based mortgage lender,
settled a class action lawsuit brought on behalf of borrowers who
43. Eric Dash, Citigroup Loses $9.8 Billion; Will Cut Jobs, N.Y.TIMES, Jan. 15,
2008, at C1.
44. See, e.g., Parker v. Long Beach Mortgage Co., No. 06-2002, 2008 WL 53276
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2008).
45. Id.
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S46
said they were overcharged in a yield-spread premium scheme by
lenders who put them into loans with higher interest rates than for
which they qualified. A yield spread premium is the cash rebate
paid to a mortgage broker based on selling an interest rate above
the wholesale par rate for which the borrower qualifies. A 2004
study by the Center for Responsible Lending, a nonprofit research
and policy organization that advocates fair and responsible lending
practices, found that yield spread premiums were included in
eighty-five to ninety percent of all subprime mortgages, and that
loans, which included yield spread premiums, cost borrowers an
additional $800 to $3,000 more than loans that did not have yield
48
spread premiums. The $5.1 million NovaStar settlement came
after a Washington judge ruled that the failure to disclose the
payment of yield spread premiums was unfair or deceptive under
Washington law.49
B. Securitization Litigation - Luminent Mortgage Capital v.
HSBC Securities
Luminent's claim alleges that HSBC Securities breached
repurchase agreements and wrongfully confiscated bonds posted
as collateral for the repurchase agreements.0 The agreements
provided that two Luminent subsidiaries could execute repurchase
transactions with HSBC whereby the subsidiaries would transfer
securities to HSBC in exchange for payment, while HSBC
simultaneously agreed to transfer back to the subsidiaries those
securities at a certain date or on demand.5 The agreements
46. See Elizabeth Rhodes, NovaStar Mortgage Settles Class Action, SEATrLE
TIMES, June 22, 2007, at D2. A yield-spread premium is "a legal but controversial
practice in which lenders pay independent mortgage brokers a premium to put
borrowers into a loan with a higher interest rate than what they qualified for." Id.
47. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Releases Staff Report on
Mortgage Broker Compensation Disclosures, Feb. 27, 2004, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2
004/02/mortgagerpt.shtm.
48. Yield Spread Premiums: A Powerful Incentive for Equity Theft, CRL ISSUE
BRIEF No. 11 (Ctr. for Responsible Lending), June 18, 2004, available at http://www.
responsiblelending.org/pdfs/ibOll-YSPEquity-Theft-0604.pdf.
49. See Rhodes, supra note 46.
50. Luminent Mortgage Capital v. HSBC Sec. Inc., No. 07-CIV-9340, 2007 WL
3092976, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2007).
51. Id. at *13-16.
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further provided HSBC could issue a margin call requiring the
subsidiaries to post additional cash or collateral in the event the
market value of the securities posted with HSBC fell below a
certain level." The repurchase agreements provided that the
failure of the subsidiaries to meet a margin call would trigger an
event of default, entitling HSBC to liquidate the collateral."
In late July and early August of 2007, one Luminent
subsidiary executed a total of eight repurchase trades with HSBC
for bonds totaling over $24 million. 4 However, on the day the
repurchase transactions were executed, the bond market "seized
up" against the perceived crisis in the subprime mortgage loan
market, causing the value of the bonds to drop and prompting
HSBC to issue margin calls in the amount of $5.47 million to cover
the decrease in value. 5' Luminent, as guarantor of the bonds for its
subsidiaries, refused to pay the margin demand on the belief that
the bonds were not accurately valued.56 At the end of August,
HSBC informed Luminent that it had already conducted an
auction with respect to the bonds and had submitted the highest
bid."1
Luminent's complaint alleges breach of contract, breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, conversion, and unjust
enrichment. 8 The specific allegations were that HSBC falsely
discounted and misrepresented the true value of the bonds and
conducted an inadequate bidding process that was not on par with
standards of commercial reasonableness." Knowing of the
devaluation, the complaint continues, HSBC was able to
"opportunistically and improperly misappropriate the securities, '
and in the eyes of Luminent, "was simply exploiting an
aberrational market as a pretext to unreasonably mark down the
purported value of the [b]onds, demand an unreasonable amount
52. Id. at *17.
53. Id. at *19.
54. Id. at *20-22.
55. Id. at *23-24.
56. Luminent Mortgage Capital, 2007 WL 3092976 at *25.
57. Id. at *26-28.
58. Id. at *35-53.
59. Id. at *28, *30.
60. Id. at *8.
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of additional collateral from Plaintiffs, and then unilaterally
confiscate the bonds for itself at an artificially steep discount.,
61
The case is pending in the Southern District of New York.
C. Securities Litigation
1. Private Litigation - Saltzman v. Citigroup
Saltzman's complaint alleges that Citigroup, in violation of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, issued false and misleading
statements regarding the company's business and financial results
and concealed the failure to write down impaired securities
containing subprime debt.62 Saltzman alleges that this false
information and concealment artificially inflated the stock of
Citigroup, and had Citigroup taken appropriate reserves for the
large amount of CDOs both on and off its balance sheets, investors
would have known this and could have taken appropriate action
63before the subprime mortgage meltdown.
As of September 30, 2007, Citigroup's Securities and
Banking (S&B) Business held approximately $55 billion in U.S.
subprime direct exposure, $43 billion of which was due to
exposures in the most super senior tranches of CDOs.64 These
tranches were collateralized by asset backed securities. 6' These
super senior tranches, the complaint states, are not subject to
valuation based on observable market conditions.66 Due to rating
agency downgrades and other market developments, changes to
the discount rates applicable to these super senior tranches have
resulted in significant declines in the estimates of the fair value of
the S&B senior exposures.
67
Saltzman claims that Citigroup knew of its exposure due to
its S&B subprime holdings, but concealed such information from
61. Id. at *30.
62. Saltzman v. Citigroup Inc., No. 07 CIV 9901, 2007 WL 4189448, at *1, *3
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2007).
63. Id. at *4.
64. Id. at *5.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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the investing public.6 Specifically, Citigroup concealed that its
"portfolio of CDOs contained billions of dollars worth of impaired
and risky securities, many of which were backed by subprime
mortgage loans., 69 The complaint further alleges that Citigroup
"failed to account for highly leveraged loans," and the company
"failed to record impairment of debt securities which they knew or
disregarded were impaired, causing the [c]ompany's results to be
false and misleading.,
70
2. SEC Enforcement Efforts
As a result of the subprime crisis, some three dozen recent
investigations by the SEC have focused on whether financial firms
should have warned the public earlier about the declining value of
securities sold to investors and how those firms valued those
securities, especially in comparison to how they valued their own
securities." The Wall Street Journal reports that the SEC has set
up a working group that is investigating whether firms selling
securities outside of exchanges with readily available pricing
information adequately warned investors of the risks of such
investments.72 The group is also investigating whether the firms
timely informed investors of problems with their financial
statements and how these firms account for off-balance sheet
entities that hold MBSs.
73
In December 2007, the SEC's Division of Corporation
Finance sent a letter to a number of public companies identifying
potential areas of disclosure that should be considered for
upcoming annual filings in relation to off-balance sheet disclosure
requirements. 74 The letter was sent to companies identifying
68. Saltzman, 2007 WL 4189448 at *8.
69. Id. at *8(a).
70. Id. at *8(b)-(c).
71. See Susan Pulliam & Kara Scannell, Pricing Probes on Wall Street Gather
Steam, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 2007, at C1. Firms mentioned as the targets for
investigation include UBS's Dillon Read unit, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch & Co.,
Bear Steams, and the Royal Bank of Canada. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, Sample Letter Sent to Public Companies that
Have Identified Investments in Structured Investment Vehicles, Conduits, or
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themselves as having been "involved with certain non-consolidated
conduits, [structured investment vehicles], and collateralized debt
obligations."75  The specific disclosure issues to be considered
include: categories and rating of assets the off-balance sheet entity
holds; any material difficulties the off-balance sheet entity has
experienced in issuing its commercial paper or other financing
during the period; types of variable interests held in off-balance
sheet entities; obligations under the liquidity facilities; and Item
303 known trends and uncertainties that could have a material
effect on income, operations, or liquidity.76  No doubt the
increased scrutiny of the SEC will continue as more banks and
financial institutions come under pressure from the subprime
fallout and are made parties to litigation.
D. Public Interest Litigation - Lawsuits by the Cities of
Baltimore and Cleveland
In an effort to curb the growing number of foreclosures, the
City of Baltimore has filed a claim in United States District Court
against California-based Wells Fargo Bank, who, the city alleges,
violated fair housing laws by engaging in a practice of "reverse
redlining" through selling high-interest, high priced subprime
loans to African American residents at a disproportionately higher
rate than they did to whites.77 In 2005 and 2006, the complaint
alleges, "two-thirds of the company's foreclosures were in census
tracts where at least sixty percent of the residents were black.,
78
"Wells Fargo," the complaint continues, "has been, and continues
to be, engaged in a pattern or practice of unfair, deceptive and
discriminatory lending activity in Baltimore's minority
neighborhoods that have the effect and purpose of placing
inexperienced and undeserved borrowers in loans they cannot
Collateralized Debt Obligations (Off-Balance Sheet Entities) (Dec. 11, 2007), http://
www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfoffbalanceltrl207.htm.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. John Fritze, Lawsuit by City Targets Lender, BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 8, 2008, at
1A.
78. Id.
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afford."7 9  The City of Baltimore is seeking recovery from
"unrealized property tax revenue, added police and fire protection
and legal costs - because of homes abandoned after foreclosure. '' 8°
The City of Cleveland has filed a similar suit against
twenty-one banks, including Citigroup, Bank of America, Wells
Fargo, and Countrywide Financial, although Cleveland's claim
alleges the banks' lending practices violated public nuisance law
and "led to widespread abandonment of homes. 81
In 2007, the NAACP brought suit against twelve of the
country's largest mortgage lenders, alleging that institutionalized
racism in subprime mortgage lending resulted in African
Americans being thirty percent more likely to be issued a loan
with higher interest rates than whites with similar borrowing
qualifications. 82
While many areas of "public interest" litigation may be
unlikely to withstand legal scrutiny, the mere existence of the
lawsuits illustrates an undeniable truth: the wave of subprime
litigation currently underway is only the beginning of what is to
come. Inevitably, creative lawyering will result in a plethora of
contentious litigation, especially given the fact that many of the
potential defendants, in all categories of subprime litigation, are
perceived as "deep pockets."
IV. CONCLUSION
The subprime crisis and its fallout are far from over.
Indeed, the better assessment is perhaps that the precise contours
are yet to be fully known. It is estimated that nearly $1 trillion in
ARMs will reset in the next three years.83 ARM resets combined
with a weak housing market will fuel a continued liquidity crisis for
the homeowner, the subprime investor, and the underwriting
financial institution alike. The resulting pinch will ensure
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Christopher Maag, Cleveland Sues 21 Lenders Over Subprime Mortgages,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2008, at A9.
82. NAACP v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., No. 07-CIV-00794 (C.D. Cal. July 11.
2007).
83. See Barr, supra note 15.
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uncertainty in the capital markets and the perpetuation of
subprime litigation for the foreseeable future.
In the meantime, regulators worldwide are devising efforts
to curtail the growing crisis. In the United States, for example,
President Bush announced on December 6, 2007, a plan to
implement a moratorium on some upwardly adjusting subprime
ARMs in an effort to prevent a further wave of foreclosures.8
How and when this plan will become a reality remains to be seen.
One can only speculate when the subprime crisis will end.
In late December 2007, Alan Greenspan, the former Chairman of
the Federal Reserve, attempted to forecast the life-cycle of the
crisis:
The current credit crisis will come to an end when
the overhang of inventories of newly built homes is
largely liquidated, and home price deflation comes
to an end. That will stabilize the now-uncertain
value of the home equity that acts as a buffer for all
home mortgages, but most importantly for those
held as collateral for residential mortgage-backed
securities. Very large losses will, no doubt, be taken
as a consequence of the crisis. But after a period of
protracted adjustment, the U.S. economy, and the
world economy more generally, will be able to get
back to business.85
According to this prediction, this is only the beginning.
84. Alison Vekshin, Bush Aims to Prolong Expansion With Subprime Freeze,
BLOOMBERG, Dec. 6, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&re
fer=home&sid=aUtXgB6b6ybU.
85. Alan Greenspan, The Roots of the Mortgage Crisis, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12,
2007, at A19.
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